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To ensure the peaceful intent for production and processing of nuclear fuel, verifiable process monitoring of 
the fuel production cycle is required. As part of a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-EURATOM 
collaboration in the field of international nuclear safeguards, the  DOE Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), 
the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) and Directorate General-Energy (DG-ENER) 
developed and demonstrated a new concept in process monitoring, enabling the use of operator process 
information by branching a second, authenticated data stream to the Safeguards inspectorate. This 
information would be complementary to independent safeguards data, improving the understanding of the 
plant's operation. The concept is called the Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS). EDAS 
transparently captures, authenticates, and encrypts communication data that is transmitted between operator 
control computers and connected analytical equipment utilized in nuclear processes controls. The intent is 
to capture information as close to the sensor point as possible to assure the highest possible confidence in 
the branched data. Data must be collected transparently by the EDAS: Operator processes should not be 
altered or disrupted by the insertion of the EDAS as a monitoring system for safeguards. EDAS employs 
public key authentication providing `jointly verifiable' data and private key encryption for confidentiality. 
Timestamps and data source are also added to the collected data for analysis. The core of the system 
hardware is in a security enclosure with both active and passive tamper indication. Further, the system has 
the ability to monitor seals or other security devices in close proximity. This paper will discuss the EDAS 
concept, recent technical developments, intended application philosophy and the planned future progression 
of this system. 
1. Intended Application Philosophy 
 
The same equipment that is used for facility operations can be of interest also for safeguards purposes. 
Unfortunately equipment such as scales, pressure sensors, and gamma counters cannot currently be used to 
serve both purposes, because the data coming from these devices is not authenticated and therefore cannot 
be fully trusted by a safeguards inspectorate. Duplicate systems, separately owned and operated by the 
facility operator and inspectorate, would in principle solve the issue. However, these not only require
additional resources and add to system complexity, duplication of sensors is also frequently impossible for 
limitations of space, operational safety considerations, accessibility issues etc... 
 
EDAS addresses the problem by providing a second, authenticated branch of the data generated by 
monitoring equipment, as close as possible to the source of the data. EDAS will allow both the facility 
operator and safeguards inspectorates to use a single piece of analytical equipment to meet both of their 
monitoring requirements. For the operator, the signal coming from the equipment will be completely 
unaffected by EDAS and the operator will be able to use existing infrastructure without modification. The 
separate signal used by the safeguards inspectorate will indicate the source device of the data, be time-
stamped, authenticated, and encrypted. The authentication mechanism used by EDAS employs symmetric 
key cryptography. All of these operations will occur in the closest proximity possible to the point where the 
actual measurements are taken. 
 
2. EDAS Concept 
 
The design goals of EDAS can be broken down into four fundamental principles: branch the data as close as 
possible to the source, do not interfere with data communications between the operator and the equipment, 
employ a modular design for ease of application, and enable both parties to be confident that the two 
branches provide identical information. 
 
 
 
2.1. Source Proximity 
Once a measurement is taken the data associated with the measurement has a binary representation that can 
easily be manipulated when transferred over communications lines. To ensure that this data is not altered it 
is ideal to begin protecting it at the soonest moment possible. Ideally EDAS would be running on the same 
microcontroller or DSP that acquires the data, but for the short term this is not possible within close 
proximity to the serial communications port is thus the chosen compromise. To retain the greatest amount 
of confidence in the measurement data the serial communications cable connecting the analytical equipment 
to EDAS should be as short as possible and protected using tamper sensing or indicating conduit [1]. 
 
2.2. Non-interference 
The facility operator cannot risk any malfunction or misconfiguration of critical process monitoring 
equipment and the safeguard authorities cannot run a liability risk in case of malfunction. EDAS must be 
fail-safe, and cannot be capable of making any changes to the operator system.  Just as important, it must be 
possible to convince an operator that EDAS is sufficiently low risk. 
 
2.3. Modularity 
EDAS is a concept--not a set of hardware or software; any system realization should be flexible enough to 
allow hardware implementations of subsystems to replace software implementation and vice versa. Modular 
design enables such flexibility. For example, a hardware-based cryptographic module could handle 
authentication and encryption rather than writing software. Modularity enables an upgrade of the currently 
implemented serial splitter to something more advanced, such as a data diode, without modification to the 
rest of the system. 
 
2.4. Identical Information 
EDAS is of no use if the data that it generates can be repudiated by either the facility operator or the 
inspectorate. For this reason public-key authentication is preferred: the operator would be able to verify the 
signature of data transmissions independently, and neither party can create measurement data that can be 
authenticated by the other party. 
 
3.  System Components 
 
In order to support the greatest amount of existing equipment, EDAS currently can capture data from a 
variety of serial interfaces including RS-485 and RS-232 at several baud rates up to 1.152 kbps. Because 
data from different devices can arrive either in bursts or continuously, the data stream from a device can be 
divided into blocks based upon a set number of bytes, divided into transmission bursts based upon the delay 
between bursts, or some combination of a maximum number of bytes as well as a maximum delay between 
data bursts. 
 
The authentication approach employed by EDAS uses asymmetric RSA cryptography by default. However, 
EDAS uses a pipelining mechanism to transfer bytes between various subsystems, so the authentication 
approach can be changed to symmetric or even one based upon a Hash Machine Authentication Code 
(HMAC) depending upon application. The encryption mechanism is currently based upon AES, but it can 
also be substituted with any other block cipher, as required. 
 
Finally the subsystem that stores the data stream into files to be transferred over the network is also flexible 
enough to divide data by size or by date (e.g. to create day file)s. By design EDAS is implemented to be as 
straight forward as possible to facilitate integration into and implementation on various types of process 
monitoring equipment. 
4. Recent Technical Achievements 
 
A conceptual prototype of EDAS was demonstrated in April, 2010 at the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre, attended also by representatives from the IAEA. The hardware components of this system 
 
 
 
consisted of a readily available PC104 computer and a serial communications splitting device that is 
commercially available. The primary EDAS software modules implemented data pipelining techniques that 
made it possible to optionally encrypt, authenticate and divide captured serial communications into various 
sized blocks. The PC104 system was programmed to demonstrate the real-time capture of serial data 
transmitted from a Mettler Toledo Mass Scale, a Mensor Pressure sensor, and a Sick laser range finder. The 
tests demonstrated the serial capture, authentication, encryption, and secure transmission features. Other 
software was written to interpret the inspectorate data stream coming from the EDAS system.  The 
visualization readily confirmed that EDAS captured all of the serial communications of interest accurately. 
   
5. Planned Future Progress of System 
 
Since the EDAS system today is still in the experimental prototype phase, there are several areas that can be 
improved in the near term. The first improvement is to design a system board that completely isolates the 
EDAS serial capture from the operator serial pass through.  
 
In this configuration, the serial capture module utilizes two input buffers that support high data rate 
requirements. The serial capture module is designed to allow transparent tapping of bi-directional digital 
data travelling between the analytical equipment and the operator processes. It utilizes active buffer-drivers 
that split digital signals without interference and provide those to the serial capture module and the 
respective intended destination. The serial capture module also incorporates a power-fail functionality that 
allows communication to continue uninterrupted, from the perspective of the operator, and provides an 
indication to the inspectorate that the state of the serial capture module communications has changed. This 
process occurs without the knowledge of the operator. 
 
A second improvement will integrate tamper indicating functionality in the next EDAS prototype. These 
improvements are detailed in the included figure. EDAS will also incorporate tamper sensor monitoring for 
both internal and external sensors. The external tamper sensors will be applied to the analytical equipment 
as possible based upon the specific application.  
 
 
 
 Figure 1 of the proposed concept for demonstrating Enhanced Data Authentication 
 
 
 
 
Operator acceptance of an inspectorate branching capability is essential. Although EDAS already 
demonstrates the functionality required for the inspectorate to trust the duplicate data stream, it has not yet 
addressed operator concerns about reliability and non-interference. Not only must EDAS address those 
concerns, but it must also be possible to demonstrate its fail safe functionality, convincingly. 
 
Finally it is the goal of EDAS to utilize knowledge gained from the near term activities to determine best 
approaches for the development of safeguards guidance policies and equipment requirements. Work with 
equipment manufacturers (e.g. Canberra, Honeywell analytical equipment) to provide support for 
authentication requirements at or near the sensor, whichever is most reasonable. It is envisioned that the 
verification techniques will gradually envelop the sensor points and the associated analytical equipment. 
Techniques will eventually add tamper indicating (active and passive) features as well as moving EDAS 
closer to the sensor points where practical. 
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